

RESEARCH REPORTS

Reviews of new research by public agencies and private institutions

"America's Old Age Crisis: Public Policy and the Two Worlds of Aging."

Basic Books, 10 E. 53rd Street, New York, N.Y. 10022. 232 pp. \$16.50.
Author: Stephen Crystal

Behind Social Security and other federal programs for the elderly is the unspoken assumption that most retirees are impoverished, decrepit, and lonely. In fact, says Crystal, an official with New York City's Human Resources Department, such notions hold true for only a small proportion of Americans over 65.

While poverty among the elderly during the 1960s averaged twice the national rate, today it is down to 15 percent, one point higher than the U.S. average. Thanks to advances in medicine, the "young old" between 65 and 74 today are likely to be as healthy as were those 10 years their junior in previous generations. And only 13 percent of the elderly responding to a 1981 public opinion survey reported that social isolation was a severe personal problem for them.

In reality, Crystal contends, there are "two worlds of aging"—one that conforms to the old stereotype and another, far larger, composed of relatively healthy, well-off retirees. By failing to distinguish between the two, he argues, federal policy perpetuates the split: The well-off get more help than they need, the disadvantaged less.

Social Security and other federal programs have done much to shape the way the elderly live. Today, for example, seven million of the 11 million aged Americans live alone. The chief reason: Given enough money, most of the elderly prefer independence from their children.

(Indeed, only about five percent of the aged receive any regular income

from their children; twice as many give money to their offspring.)

Public policy also fosters inequities. Tax exemptions for worker contributions to personal and corporate pension plans will cost Washington some \$46 billion in revenues in 1983—a hefty "tax expenditure." Nearly half of the work force is now covered by such plans, but blacks are only half as likely to be included as whites. As of 1977, only a third of working women (versus half of all male workers) were covered. Because employees typically are not "vested" until they have been on the payroll for 10 years, relatively few blacks or women collect their benefits.

The result: The systems' beneficiaries are mostly white males and their wives. One 1978 study found that 65 percent of all "tax expenditures" for retirement programs went to workers earning \$20,000 or more annually. Overall, the median income for pensioners collecting only Social Security is \$6,200; for those collecting additional benefits, \$12,200.

Other federal old-age policies also disproportionately aid the middle class. Wealthier retirees, for example, are far more likely to use Medicare benefits than are their lower-income counterparts because of their sophistication and ability to pay the "deductible" portion of the insurance.

Retirees with incomes over \$15,000 received twice as much in Medicare benefits as did those with incomes below \$5,000, according to a 1968 study.

About 42 percent of Medicaid outlays are collected by the five percent of the over-65 population in nursing

homes. In 1976, 95 percent of these residents were white. Partly by choice, blacks are more likely to take care of their impaired parents at home. But federal aid for home care is meager.

Such inequities and rapid growth in the over-65 population require revised national old-age policies, Crystal contends. But he believes the current *total* (\$190 billion) of direct outlays and "tax expenditures," now nearly equal to one-third of the federal budget, should be "sufficient."

Immediate pension "vesting," for example, could be made mandatory. Strains on Social Security could be eased by eliminating the financial advantages of early retirement: Three-quarters of new recipients now retire *before* reaching age 65.

Other proposals: taxing a portion of benefits going to those with high outside incomes, slowing the growth of cost-of-living increases.

But Washington cannot return responsibility for the elderly to families,

Crystal believes. Instead, it should aim federal resources at those most in need—the poor, the growing population of "frail" elderly over 75, and the disabled. "Severe need in old age," he notes, "has now become and will continue to be largely a woman's problem," because women live far longer than do men.

A critical concern is long-term health care. Subsidies for at-home care should be increased; hospitals should not automatically shunt elderly patients to nursing homes; and more emphasis should be put on using the homes as gateways to the outside world rather than as permanent residences.

A comprehensive, coherent old-age policy would require a complete re-vamping of today's programs, Crystal concedes. But as the elderly increase their share of the population from 11 percent today to 21 percent in 2030, such an overhaul will become unavoidable.

"TV Coverage of the Oil Crises: How Well Was the Public Served?"

Media Institute, 3017 M St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20007. 172 pp. \$12.95.
Editor: Leonard J. Theberge

What did the three major TV evening news programs say about America's two great "oil crises" of 1973–74 and 1978–79?

Not much that was relevant to the problem at hand, according to the Washington-based Media Institute, despite all the vivid TV film of gasoline lines, disgruntled motorists, OPEC leaders, oil industry spokesmen, and federal policy-makers.

The first crisis followed the Arab oil embargo of October 1973. As most TV newsmen failed to note, it also followed President Nixon's below-market price controls on gasoline; domes-

tic oil producers had cut back on production and exploration, and oil imports zoomed, providing 37 percent of U.S. needs in 1973. The 1973–74 gasoline lines, as economists pointed out, stemmed from Washington's ill-fated efforts to allocate fuel and keep prices down.

Federal intervention continued, with varying impact on different segments of the oil industry. TV failed to observe that some firms profited, but others did not, even as OPEC reaped the main rewards.

Echoing other expert opinion, a 1977 Rand Corporation report (ig-



TV commentators were not alone in believing that U.S. oil price decontrol would be a boon to oil companies. Yet, today, gasoline prices are down.

nored by TV) said that U.S. decontrol would not increase gasoline prices but, by encouraging domestic production, would reduce dependence on foreign oil. President Carter ultimately asked Congress for gradual decontrol; President Reagan ended all controls in 1981. Since then, U.S. gasoline prices have dropped along with both imports and major oil company profits.

Using the Vanderbilt University TV news archive, Media Institute researchers examined 1,462 relevant stories on the ABC, CBS, and NBC evening news shows totaling 39.5 hours during the two oil crises.

When it came to reporting the "causes" of both crises, roughly 72 percent of the discussion focused on OPEC and the oil industry, with 35 percent of it blaming oilmen. Only 18 percent focused on federal actions.

As for discussions of "solutions" to the crises, only 21 percent of TV coverage cited proposals that favored a market solution. Fully 50 percent focused on conservation (e.g., turning out more lights, rationing), and 15 percent dealt, mostly favorably, with proposals for more regulation by Washington.

All in all, the Institute concludes, the TV networks, out of naiveté and/or lust for melodrama, paid scant attention to the real policy issue in both crises: government solutions versus market solutions, such as deregulation. Rather, the network newscasters, relying heavily on Washington officials as sources, presented the answer "as a choice among [federal] non-market measures: conservation versus rationing versus forms of regulation and price controls."

"The Baby-Boom Generation and the Economy."

Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.
183 pp. \$19.95 cloth, \$7.95 paper.
Author: Louise B. Russell

Many economists maintain that the baby-boom generation, by sheer force of numbers, has determined the course of the economy since World War II and will continue to do so through the rest of the century. It has been blamed for high housing costs and unemployment, pitied for the increased job competition its members face. But Russell, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, argues that its influence is exaggerated.

As it matured, the baby-boom generation—born in the years 1947–57—swelled the ranks of elementary and secondary school students from 28 million in 1950 to 51 million in 1970. School systems were obliged to expand.

But according to Russell, they did far more than was necessary. The amount spent on *each* student rose from \$596 to \$990 in constant dollars during the same 20-year period. The requirements for teachers' certification were tightened even as their numbers ballooned. Universities, pursuing the new goal of universal higher education, expanded beyond what the population increase demanded. Despite its size, the baby-boom generation was not shortchanged.

Unemployment rates for the baby-boom generation are unusually high, but the evidence that the cause is increased competition for the available jobs, though plausible, is "inconclusive." And these higher rates contrib-

ute less than one percentage point to the national unemployment statistics—certainly not enough to account for the high joblessness of the 1970s.

Baby-boom workers do feel the pinch of their large numbers in their pocketbooks. The earnings of male workers from age 20 to 24 declined from 66 percent of those of their 45-to-54-year-old counterparts in 1958 to 56 percent during the late 1970s. Yet it is unclear how much of the decline is due to other factors—e.g., recession, the shift to service industries.

In absolute terms, Russell adds, the baby boomers enjoy far higher earnings than did any previous generation.

Did they account for the massive increase in home-ownership and other changes in consumer spending habits during the 1970s? Actually, older generations bought more than half the new housing built during the decade. Housing boomed because it was a good investment. Overall, Russell notes, interest rates, inflation, and other economic factors have far more influence on such decisions than do demographics.

Economists now fear the baby-boom generation, as it ages, will bankrupt the Social Security system. But, as in the past, changes in economic conditions and human behavior are likely to prove more important, confounding most predictions.

"Demography," Russell concludes, "is not destiny."

Key facts on ageing and health: explanation of ageing, common health conditions associated with ageing, Factors influencing Healthy Ageing, Challenges in responding to population ageing and WHO's response. By the middle of the century many countries for e.g. Chile, China, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation will have a similar proportion of older people to Japan. A longer life brings with it opportunities, not only for older people and their families, but also for societies as a whole. America has been different, until now. Higher fertility and more international migration have helped stave off an aging population and the country has remained younger as a result. But those trends are changing. Americans are having fewer children and the baby boom of the 1950s and 1960s has yet to be repeated. Fewer babies, coupled with longer life expectancy equals a country that ages faster. Although declining fertility plays a role, the driving force behind America's aging is the baby boomers. As one of the largest generations in the country, boomers leave a substantial imprint on the population. The aging of the aged: the number of "old old" will grow much faster than the number of "young old." The United Nations projects that by 2050, the number of people aged 65 to 84 worldwide will grow from 400 million to 1.3 billion (a threefold increase), while the number of people aged 85 and over will grow from 26 million to 175 million (a sixfold increase) -- and the number aged 100 and over from 135,000 to. At the top of the list is the impact of the age wave on foreign policy and international security. Will the developed world be able to maintain its security commitments? Is the rapidly aging developed world fated to decline? Must it cede leadership to younger and faster-growing societies? For the answer to be no, the developed world must redefine that role around a new mission. Aging populations pose a challenge to the fiscal and macroeconomic stability of many societies due to increased government spending on pension, healthcare, and social benefits programs for the elderly. Population aging "the increase of the share of older individuals in a society due to fertility declines and rising life expectancy" is an irreversible global trend with far-reaching economic and socio-political consequences. In addition, the recent economic crisis not only increased the demand for social protection but it. Therefore, pertinent and prompt policy solutions are necessary to ensure fiscal and macroeconomic sustainability as well as the health and well-being of citizens of all ages. A Two-Part Solution Focused on Work. The future of the world for an ageing population is a good deal more complex and interesting than the collection suggests. Age Concern England. DAVID HOBMAN. Stephen Crystal, America's Old Age Crisis, Basic Books, New York, 1982, 232 pp., \$16.50, ISBN 0 465 00124 6. This is an important and timely book. reasoned policy alternatives that he believes would resolve the most pressing and critical fiscal and psychosocial components of the 'crisis' in public policy. Crystal's analysis of the 'crisis' leads him to conclude that the existing array of income maintenance, health care, retirement, and welfare policies are inequitable, inefficient, and insufficient.